Introduction
T he role of competition in health care has long been debated as the evidence is mixed. Advocates of the pursuit of competition assert that it will lead to lower costs, and thus creates broader access to services and products for patients. Many empirical studies have demonstrated a positive effect of competition on the quality of care. [1] [2] [3] In a widely referenced study, Kessler and McClellan assessed patients admitted to hospitals for acute myocardial infarction (AMI), and concluded that hospital competition led to an improved quality of care, as measured by 1-year mortality rates and re-admission rates. 2 Nonetheless, more competition translating into a higher quality of care is not the only argument in the literature. Mutter et al. 4 assessed the impacts of hospital competition on 38 distinct measures of inpatient quality by employing Quality Indicator software from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality in the US, and declared that the effects of hospital competition were not unidirectional, as some quality indicators showed positive associations between competition and inpatient quality of care, some revealed adverse outcomes, while still others indicated neutral effects. Other studies also pointed to a negligible or negative association between competition and the quality of care. 5, 6 Although there are arguments over the justification and effect of promoting competition among healthcare providers, the mechanism of market competition has been enacted in publicly funded healthcare systems in several countries, notably the Medicare programme in the US and the National Health Service (NHS) in the UK. There is a growing body of studies that focused on the effects of non-price competition under fixed price regulations on the quality of care. 2, 7, 8 Kessler and McClellan assessed the impact of hospital competition on AMI mortality for Medicare beneficiaries, and concluded that in a market with fixed prices, higher competition led to improvements in clinical performance (i.e. lower mortality). 2 However, research findings from the UK concerning the relationship between provider competition and clinical quality were relatively ambiguous. 1, 5, 9 As stated, prior studies have not provided consistent evidence concerning whether the policy of introducing market competition accomplishes the desired objective of improving the quality of care in publicly funded healthcare systems. Therefore, in this study, we revisited this critical issue by utilizing two nationwide datasets and conducting a pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis to evaluate the effects of market competition on inpatient care quality of stroke patients under Taiwan's single-payer compulsory national health insurance (NHI) system.
Methods

Data sources
This 11-year population-based retrospective study was based on two nationwide datasets in Taiwan: the NHI Research Database (NHIRD), and the National Hospital and Services Survey (NHSS). In this study, the NHIRD was utilized to retrieve data of all hospitalized stroke patients from 1 January 1997, through 31 December 2007, while the NHSS was employed to collect information used for constructing the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI). The theories of microeconomics and industrial organization suggest that the HHI is a customary measure for firm competition within market areas, since it accounts for both number of firms as well as the market concentration by incorporating the relative size of all firms in a market. [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] Baker and colleagues 10 argued that the HHI was suitable for analyzing competition among health care organizations and physicians in different specialties and markets. In a recent study addressing the issue of physician competition, Richards et al. 16 also used the HHI to gauge physician market concentration. We thus adopted the HHI as the measure of the level of market competition in this study.
Study population
The NHI Administration (NHIA) of Taiwan replaced the fee-forservices payment scheme with a global budget payment (GBP) system on 1 July 2002. It is well documented that healthcare expenditures have considerably increased in both developing and developed countries in the past several decades. Among policy interventions to contain rapidly rising medical costs, GBP systems have gained popularity. It is generally agreed that a GBP system is capable of exerting effects on healthcare expenditures, but researchers have not reached consensus on other impacts caused by a GBP system, such as market competition and quality of care. [17] [18] [19] Therefore, we specifically selected the study period of 1997 through 2007 to take into account the possible impacts of the GBP system's inauguration on 1 July 2002.
The initial study sample of this research comprised all patients who were hospitalized due to stroke between 1 January 1997 and 31 December 2007, and we further categorized them into patients with hemorrhagic stroke (ICD-9-CM codes 430 and 431), and ischemic stroke (ICD-9-CM codes 433 and 434). To increase the likelihood of including only first-time stroke patients in our cohort, we selected patients who had not been diagnosed with any type of stroke for at least 1 year prior to the index date (date of hospitalization). In addition, to help reduce bias in the parametric estimation, those hospitals where stroke patients received treatment needed to have at least 30 incident stroke cases in the index year, and there were at least 2 years of data available from the hospitals. Hence, we excluded hospital-year observations from very low-volume hospitals. Accordingly, the 247 379 incident ischemic stroke patients comprised 1342 hospital-year observations (from 203 hospitals), and the 79 741 incident hemorrhagic stroke patients consisted of 678 hospital-year observations (from 97 hospitals) for further analyses. All eligible study participants were then monitored from the baseline until either the incidence of hemorrhagic or ischemic stroke was observed, or patients were no longer eligible for the NHI programme due to dropping out or dying, or the end of the observation period was reached (31 December 2007), whichever came first. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the selection of study samples in the study.
Variables
We used four indicators to measure the inpatient care quality based on results of a literature review and the availability of data for relevant variables in our datasets: (i) the in-hospital mortality rate; (ii) 30-day post-operative complication rate; (iii) 14-day readmission rate and (iv) 30-day re-admission rate. Furthermore, we adopted the HHI to gauge healthcare market competition in this study.
In this study, the HHI was the sum of squared market share percentages for each hospital in a given healthcare market, and the market share was measured by the percentage of inpatient days attributable to stroke patients of a hospital in the defined market. We used medical care networks as the designated healthcare market area to evaluate the effects of market competition on the quality of care. To ensure a more-balanced distribution of health and medical care resources, Taiwan was divided into 17 medical care regions. 20 Since one of the 17 medical care networks covers the areas of offshore islands with very few hospitals, we only used 16 medical care networks to construct the HHI when utilizing the second dataset of the study, the NHSS. We used the NHSS to calculate the HHI from 1997 through 2007, and then applied the HHI to categorize the degrees of market competition as follows: highly competitive (less concentrated; HHI < 1000), moderately competitive (1000 HHI 1800) and less competitive (highly concentrated; HHI > 1800). 15 Many factors determine short-and long-term stroke outcomes. Based on prior research findings and the availability of variable information in the datasets of this study, the analysis included the following covariates: patient-level (gender, age and disease severity), [21] [22] [23] hospital-level (ownership, accreditation level and teaching hospital status) [23] [24] [25] and physician-level (years of practice as a specialist and annual stroke case volumes) 24 variables. The disease severity of a stroke patient was partially assessed by a proxy indicator, the Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI), during the year preceding the index year. 24, 26 The CCI consists of 17 predetermined clinical conditions. 26 In this analysis, however, myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, cerebrovascular disease and diabetes were removed from the calculations of the CCI since these conditions were treated as independent risk factors with the intention of optimizing risk-adjusted outcome measures of stroke care. As to the annual stroke case volumes of attending physicians, we calculated the total in-hospital days of stroke patients of those physicians in the year preceding the index year by utilizing unique physician codes in the NHIRD. We did not include the variable of hospital service volume, mentioned often in the literature, 27 as a covariate due to concerns of collinearity since we used the percentage of inpatient days to calculate the HHI.
Statistical analysis
In this analysis, we used panel data which consisted of both timeseries and cross-sectional data. Specifically, there were 11 repeated time-series observations on a set of cross-sectional units (hospitals), with hospital-years as the unit of analysis. Consequently, variables measuring characteristics of physicians and patients were at the hospital level as well. A main advantage of panel data is the likelihood of taking into account unobserved individual heterogeneity that leads to an omitted variable bias. We first conducted a pooled time-series cross-sectional analysis with a fixed-effects model to evaluate the effects of market competition on the quality of stroke patients. 28 ,29 Furthermore, we carried out a diagnostic test by performing the Hausman test to determine whether fixed-or random-effects panel models would be more appropriate, since the individual effect terms can be modeled as either fixed or random effects in a panel model. 28, 29 All analyses were performed using SAS software version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Cary, NC, USA). Statistical significance was set at P < 0.05 (two-tailed).
Results
Among the study population, most hemorrhagic stroke patients were admitted to hospitals located in highly competitive markets (39%), while hospitals located in the less competitive markets admitted the fewest hemorrhagic stroke patients (27%). Admissions of ischemic stroke patients were roughly evenly distributed among the three categories of healthcare markets. The mean age of hemorrhagic stroke patients was 61.76 years, while it was 69.48 years for ischemic stroke patients. Moreover, the majority of stroke patients were admitted to teaching hospitals. Physicians who treated hemorrhagic stroke patients had slightly higher service volumes than those who treated ischemic stroke patients (with respective total in-hospital days of 1000 vs. 960). Lastly, ischemic stroke patients had higher CCI scores (2.55) than their counterparts (2.00). Table 1 shows results from the fixed-effects model that assessed the effect of market competition on the quality of care of hemorrhagic stroke patients. After adjusting for covariates, we found that market competition and in-hospital mortality rates were significantly associated (Adj-R 2 = 0.6270). Compared to hospitals located in highly competitive markets, in-hospital mortality rates for hemorrhagic stroke patients were significantly lower in moderately ( = -0.0511, P < 0.01) and less competitive markets ( = -0.0487, P < 0.05), although to a small degree. Conversely, relationships between market competition and the other three quality indicators were all insignificant. Furthermore, we detected no significant result pertaining to the effects of market competition on the inpatient care quality of ischemic stroke patients (table 2) .
Regarding whether a fixed-or random-effects model was appropriate for this analysis, results of the Hausman tests demonstrated that the null hypothesis was rejected for nearly all models, suggesting that a fixed-effects model was the preferred specification for panel data in this study. Moreover, variance inflation factor values were Figure 1 Flow diagram of the processing of patient-level data between 1.05 and 3.94 (far below the threshold of 10), indicating that multi-collinearity was not a problem in the models of this study.
Lastly, in another manuscript under preparation, which focused on the effects of changes in reimbursement policy (i.e. the GBP system's inauguration on 1 July 2002 in Taiwan) on market competition, results indicate that although the number of hospitals had been declining steadily in Taiwan (from 719 hospitals in 1998-530 hospitals in 2007), implementation of the GBP system was significantly associated with fierce competition (data not shown).
Discussion
Stroke is the second leading cause of death and a major cause of disability worldwide. 30 Moreover, stroke is the single most prominent brain disease resulting in years of potential life lost and productivity loss. 31 Due to aging populations, the burden of caring for stroke patients will greatly increase in the foreseeable future. Hence, improving care outcomes of stroke patients is an important health policy issue, being particularly imperative for publicly funded healthcare systems.
Our results demonstrated that market competition exerted negative or negligible effects on medical care quality in both hemorrhagic and ischemic stroke patients within this publicly funded healthcare system. Such findings conform to the argument that competition among healthcare providers does not lead to positive impacts on the quality of care in studies carried out in the US, 6, 32 the UK 5, 6 and Canada. 33 Propper et al. 5 evaluated the association between competition and the quality of care in the UK (another publicly funded healthcare system), and detected that although patients' waiting times were shortened, hospital competition increased mortality rates for AMI patients to a small degree. Those arguments are comparable to this study's findings relating to stroke patients.
The question of whether hospital competition leads to improvements in health care has been a long-standing issue in health policy debates as contradictory evidence exists. 2, 6 There has been a notable increase in the use of market competition in publicly funded healthcare systems as a stimulus to generate a higher quality of care; for example, the Medicare programme in the US, 2 the NHS in the UK 1,9 and public healthcare systems in Australia, 6 New Zealand 34 and the Netherlands. 3, 7 In view of that, evidence for the effects of competition on the quality of care is vital to pertinent health policy decisions and requires further elucidation. Therefore, the relevance of results of this investigation in a universal single-payer healthcare system can be appreciated within such a context. An intriguing finding of this study, warranting further probing, is we found that competition exerted an adverse effect on the inpatient care quality of hemorrhagic stroke patients, while having no effect on ischemic stroke patients. One plausible explanation is that hemorrhagic stroke is usually more severe and with higher mortality risks than ischemic stroke. 35 A previous investigation revealed that within 3 months after a stroke occurred, patients with hemorrhagic stroke were associated with substantially higher mortality rates, compared to patients with ischemic stroke. 36 Therefore, it is reasonable that the impact of competition is discernible on the clinical care quality of hemorrhagic stroke patients (albeit slightly negative), rather than ischemic stroke patients.
A main strength of our investigation is that the study setting was the universal healthcare system of Taiwan, which is a fully publicly funded price-regulated single-payer system with low co-payment rates. Without a mandatory hierarchical referral system that exists in other countries, beneficiaries of the NHI in Taiwan can seek care from virtually any hospital they prefer. Consequently, patient choice is likely to be combined with different degrees of competition between public and private healthcare providers. Furthermore, since the government of Taiwan sets and regulates healthcare prices with near monopolistic power, and imposes a GBP system that caps total NHI expenditures, it is difficult for hospitals to initiate price competition. It is conceivable that in the context of Taiwan's healthcare system, competition among hospitals is likely to be based on non-price dimensions, such as the quality of care. Therefore, we consider that Taiwan's healthcare system provides an excellent opportunity to scrutinize the impact of market competition on the quality of care more precisely.
Additionally, this study had the benefits of utilizing two centralized national datasets and using advanced longitudinal data analytical techniques, which collectively have the capabilities to minimize selection and recall biases and thus strengthen the inferences of the study findings. Another asset of this study was that we took advantage of data retrieved from a relatively homogeneous study population under a universal healthcare system. More than 98% of the population of Taiwan is of Han Chinese ethnicity. Those features greatly reduced potential biases due to the heterogeneity of healthcare access across population sub-groups in previous studies conducted in western countries.
This study has several limitations that need to be addressed. First, potential misclassification or miscoding of diagnosis is an issue of concern for studies using administrative datasets. Nevertheless, Taiwan's NHIA routinely and randomly audits patient charts from all contracted medical care institutions to cross-check the quality of claims, which should reduce coding bias. Additionally, the accuracy of diagnoses of major diseases in the NHIRD (such as stroke) has been validated. 37 Second, in this claims-based database study, the analysis was limited by a lack of information on stroke severity and important covariates such as smoking and alcohol consumption of patients, for stroke risk adjustment. In particular, in this study the disease severity of a stroke patient was only partially assessed by a proxy indicator, the CCI. Admittedly, the degree of validity of our method of quantifying the impairment caused by a stroke is not perfect, compared to other scoring tools; for example, the National Institutes of Health Stroke Scale (NIHSS), a standardized scoring tool to measure and record the severity of neurologic deficits in acute stroke patients. 38 Nonetheless, we could not apply the NIHSS to the secondary databases of this study. Third, one of the most widely accepted indicators of the quality of care is 30-day mortality after admission. However, our data are not well-suited to utilize this indicator since related information could only be derived from the Cause of Death database, which is not available to us. Fourth, confounding by indication may reasonably exist and thus account for differences in outcomes of care to some extent. Finally, we recognize that sensitivity analyses of other samples or types of clinical care would be beneficial to support the robustness of our findings. Nevertheless, we used 'specific research subject datasets', which were constructed for research purposes by Taiwan's NHIA. Because the datasets of this analysis only comprised relevant information of stroke patients, we were unable to perform sensitivity analyses of other samples or indications.
In summary, we demonstrated that market competition exerts negative or negligible effects on the inpatient care quality of stroke patients. Consequently, simply fostering market competition might not achieve the desired objective of inducing a better quality of care. Other health policy actions, such as establishing a pay-for-performance model or placing great emphasis on the use of evidence-based processes of care and clinical pathways, need to be contemplated to improve patient outcomes. 19, 39, 40 
